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Abstract 
 
Phoenix and neighboring municipalities, like many in the South and West, pursued a 
growth strategy based on annexation in the decades after World War II.  This paper 
explores the link between annexation and competition for tax revenues.  After discussing 
arguments for annexation, it traces the history of annexation in the Phoenix metropolitan 
area.  A long-running series of "border wars" entailed litigation, pre-emptive annexations, 
and considerable intergovernmental conflict.  The paper argues that tax revenues have 
been a key motivation for annexation, particularly since the 1970s.  It then considers 
several related policy issues and argues that while opportunities for annexation are 
becoming more limited, competition for tax revenues (particularly sales tax revenues)  
continues to be fierce and to create dilemmas for municipalities in the region. 
 
JEL classifications: H71, H77, N92, R51 
 
Keywords: annexation, municipal revenues, sales tax, Phoenix, urban growth, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Phoenix has been one of the most rapidly growing cities in the United States since 
1950.  It was the fifth largest U.S. city in terms of population in July 2006, surpassing 
Philadelphia, which fell to sixth place.1  The Phoenix metropolitan area ranked thirteenth 
in 2006, whereas the Philadelphia metropolitan area was fifth.  One reason Phoenix's city 
ranking was higher than its metropolitan ranking was that the city continued to expand its 
boundaries dramatically by annexation.  More of the metropolitan area population was 
within the city than in a case like Philadelphia.  In 2006, the Phoenix city share of the 
metropolitan area population was about 37 percent, whereas Philadelphia's was only 
about 25 percent.2 
 Figure 1 shows the increase in Phoenix's land area from 1881-2005.  The city 
grew from about 17 square miles in 1950 to about 515 by 2005.  Other cities and towns in 
Maricopa County, which includes 24 municipalities, also expanded by annexation (see 
Table 1 and Figure 2).3  Buckeye grew from under 1 square mile to about 231 by 2005, 
Peoria from about 1 square mile to about 178.  Scottsdale grew rapidly for several 
decades, although it saw very little annexation in the 1990s and after 2000.  As 
municipalities approached each other's boundaries, there ensued a long-running series of 
"border wars" or what some called "range wars."4 
 Expansion by annexation was common throughout the United States in the 
nineteenth century.  In the twentieth century it slowed in the East and Midwest, but 
continued in the South and West, especially after World War II.5  This paper explores the 
link between annexation and competition for tax revenues.  After discussing some of the 
historical literature on annexation and the arguments for annexation made by 
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contemporaries, the paper traces the history of annexation in the Phoenix metropolitan 
area from the 1950s onward.  It argues that tax revenues have been a key motivation, 
particularly since the 1970s.  The paper then considers several policy issues raised by the 
annexation history and argues that while opportunities for annexation are becoming more 
limited, competition for tax revenues (particularly sales tax revenues) continues to be 
fierce and to create dilemmas for municipalities in the area. 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR ANNEXATION 
 Scholars have identified a variety of arguments or motivations for annexation.  In 
discussing nineteenth-century annexation, Kenneth Jackson emphasized the municipal 
booster spirit and the efficiency advantages of a large governmental organization.6  He 
also suggested that a desire to exploit and to control could be at work, with large 
merchants and businessmen of central business districts exercising a form of urban 
imperialism in relation to outlying areas and competing cities.  Both economic and social 
control were sought by proponents of annexation and consolidation.  Finally, he argued 
that land speculators supported annexation, although "they usually worked behind the 
scenes, and their precise role is difficult to measure."7  In the twentieth century, cities in 
the East and Midwest were blocked from further expansion by unfriendly suburbs.  
Where annexation and consolidation did occur, by cities such as Dallas, Houston, 
Indianapolis, Oklahoma City, and Jacksonville, Jackson appeared to view this outcome as 
a response to a need for metropolitan government to achieve efficiency and address 
problems that were regional in character.8  
In contrast, Richardson Dilworth's study of metropolitan fragmentation in the 
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New York region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries emphasized 
municipal corruption and its relationship to annexation and consolidation.  Central city 
officials operating in a world of corruption and graft could benefit personally from 
infrastructure development in annexed suburban communities.  This created a motivation 
for annexation.  In addition, while some suburban residents resisted annexation by central 
cities they viewed as having corrupt administrations, others sought annexation to escape 
corruption in their own local governments.  Dilworth also argued that advances in 
infrastructure technology undermined the efficiency advantages of large metropolitan 
areas and thus contributed to suburban autonomy.  Small communities could remain 
independent, yet still provide municipal services cheaply and efficiently.9 
 For both Jackson and Dilworth, economic motivations for annexation were part of 
the story, but their primary focus was on individuals (members of the local business 
community and landowners, or corrupt city officials) rather than on the municipality as a 
taxing and spending entity.  Other scholars have observed that municipal fiscal 
considerations could be one of the motivations for annexation.  Carl Abbott explained 
that as population deconcentrated in the post-World War II Sunbelt, annexation enabled 
municipalities to capture outlying residents and revenue sources.10  San Jose city officials 
justified the city's annexations between 1940 and 1970 partially on the grounds that they 
would capture a tax base for city services.11  William Fulton, discussing the area 
southeast of Los Angeles, noted that after 1954, "municipal raids upon surrounding 
county territory became common.  In particular, voracious cities coveted the tax-rich 
industrial area east of Vernon . . ."12  Ann O'M. Bowman and Michael Pagano described 
municipal fiscal motivations for annexation in the Phoenix metropolitan area, 
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highlighting Peoria's expansion in the 1990s as well as earlier annexations by Phoenix 
and other municipalities.13 
The legal mechanisms for annexation varied in different states and influenced the 
ease with which annexation could be undertaken.  Jon Teaford pointed out that "whereas 
Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia could not add rich suburban properties to their tax 
rolls, permissive annexation laws in Texas allowed Houston to absorb more than one 
hundred square miles of outlying territory between 1970 and 1987."14  At the start of the 
period considered in this paper (1950), Arizona law allowed property owners to petition 
city councils for annexation if owners of not less than one-half in value of property 
contiguous to the city signed the petition.  It also allowed the legislative body of a city to 
petition the county superior court to permit annexation of contiguous territory with a 
resident population of at least twenty-five persons.  Not less than a majority of legal 
voters or the owner or owners of land contiguous to a city also could petition the superior 
court.15  In 1954, annexation was made more difficult when the law was amended to 
specify that personal property, as well as real property, was included in determining 
whether owners of one-half of the value of property had signed the petition.  The 1954 
amendment also stipulated that the real and personal property relevant for obtaining 
signatures was property that would be subject to taxation in the event of annexation by 
the city, which was consistent with how the law previously had been interpreted.16   
In the Phoenix area the primary argument for annexation, from the perspective of 
municipal officials, often was to obtain tax revenues and fees.  During the decades after 
1950, these included sales taxes, property taxes, and other revenues such as population-
based shared revenues (e.g., state shared revenues and federal revenue sharing).  
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Population-based state shared revenues come from the state sales tax, income tax, vehicle 
license tax, highway user revenue fund, and local transportation assistance fund (funded 
by the Arizona State Lottery as well as by the vehicle license tax).  Some of the revenues 
from these sources are distributed to municipalities each year on the basis of their 
populations.  From the late 1980s, development impact fees also were collected in 
annexed (and other) areas.17 
 Of course, annexation brought additional costs as well as revenues.  The League 
of Arizona Cities and Towns encouraged municipalities to undertake studies of the 
effects of annexation before taking action, since "the additional revenue to be gained 
must be considered in light of the necessary expenditures to provide services to the 
annexed areas."18  In some cases, such considerations led to decisions against annexation.  
Mesa held off on a proposed annexation in 1974 due to concern that financing necessary 
services in the area would lower the city's income.19  The city of Phoenix's staff 
conducted a series of studies on the budgetary impact of annexations.  In several cases 
they concluded that the short-run cost-revenue relationship was negative, but that the 
longer-run outcome would be more positive.20 
 Population-based tax revenues motivated municipalities to accomplish annexation 
before the next census so that residents of the annexed territory would be included in 
population totals.  Gilbert's Acting Town Manager advised the Town Council and 
Planning and Zoning Commission that "during the calendar year 1979, annexation should 
be an important issue for the Council, P & Z Commission and the Town staff," since the 
town's boundaries for the 1980 census would include areas annexed before January 1, 
1980.21  Buckeye, a town of 5,600, annexed state prison facilities so that the inmates 
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would be counted in the town's population in the 2000 census.  At full capacity the 
facilities were expected to hold 4,600 inmates, which would bring an additional $1.3 
million in state tax revenues each year.  The town planned to use the revenues to upgrade 
its infrastructure and it agreed to provide police and fire protection and waste removal to 
the prison facilities.22 
 By annexing, cities also sought to avoid being ringed by independent 
municipalities with their own taxing powers.  In Cities Without Suburbs, David Rusk 
(former mayor of Albuquerque) argued that cities must be "elastic" in order to grow.  An 
elastic city "had vacant city land to develop and the political and legal tools to annex new 
land."23  Phoenix city officials and staff clearly shared this view.  "Phoenix has had an 
aggressive annexation policy, officials explain, to prevent a landlocked core city that 
eventually would decay and cause residents to move to the suburbs.  Instead, [Mayor] 
Barrow said, 'we annexed the suburbs.'"24  A 1974 staff report had compared Phoenix to 
cities which did not annex between 1950 and 1970.  It concluded that annexation 
provided an expanding tax base and protected the city against a proliferation of 
incorporated cities or annexations by other cities.25  In 1978, Councilman Howard Adams 
was explicit about revenue motivations: "It's incumbent upon us to protect our 
pocketbook . . . and keep bedroom communities from sapping our financial strength."26  
Mayor Margaret Hance, echoing the 1974 report, said annexation policy had been "the 
single most important factor in the health and vitality of Phoenix."27 
 In some cases, the goal of annexation was to capture existing sources of revenue, 
such as the factory outlet mall inside a 12-square-mile area near New River annexed by 
Phoenix in 1995.28  Often, however, annexation was in anticipation of future 
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development.  For example, in 1987 Gilbert annexed 150 acres at the southeast corner of 
Gilbert and Williams Field Road; plans for the area included a major shopping center, 
auto sales mall, office complex, and residential housing.29  Sales tax revenues were 
especially desired and auto malls topped the list of sought-after developments. 
 For at least several decades, Phoenix's fiscal structure has been more dependent 
on sales taxes than U.S. municipalities as a whole.  Sales taxes as a share of general 
revenue from own sources, and as a share of general revenue, are shown in Table 2.  The 
shares in Phoenix have been considerably higher than in all U.S. municipalities since 
1969-70.  In Scottsdale, sales taxes were reported in 2005 to make up half of the city's 
operating budget, with sales taxes from auto deals accounting for about 17 percent of 
those sales taxes.30   More than one-quarter of the municipalities in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area had no primary or secondary property tax in early 2005.31  Most were 
small municipalities, but they included Mesa, a city of almost one-half million people.  
(Municipalities in Arizona are not responsible for school finance; that responsibility lies 
with school districts, which levy their own taxes.) 
 For municipalities with a property tax, sales tax revenues might nonetheless be a 
more desired source of revenue than property taxes on residences, since the commercial 
establishments generating sales tax revenues require less municipal expenditures than 
residential development.  Studies of 128 communities conducted since 1986 showed that 
for each dollar of tax revenue generated, the median cost of public services for residential 
development was $1.19, for commercial and industrial development, $0.29, and for 
working and open lands (including farms, forests, and ranches), $0.36.32  As noted above, 
in making decisions about annexation, it was important for municipalities to consider not 
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only the revenue but also the expenditure consequences of those decisions. 
A second argument made by municipalities for annexation was that it would allow 
for orderly, planned growth.  Planning staff for the city of Mesa, which was considering 
annexing 14 square miles in 1978, explained that "city zoning laws are tougher than those 
of Maricopa County, which administers unincorporated land . . ."33  A former Phoenix 
City Council member claimed that "some of the worst problems the cities have is in areas 
where (land was) annexed from the counties.  Counties have just a hodgepodge of zoning 
that's inappropriate.  In the counties' defense—some of the stuff is very old—they were 
not equipped to make those kinds of (planning and zoning) decisions."34  Municipalities 
also did not want to have to upgrade infrastructure when areas eventually came within 
their boundaries. 
 Annexation also may contribute to orderly development by simplifying the 
political structure of a region.  Maricopa County has only 24 municipalities, whereas the 
Chicago region has 265 and the Los Angeles region approximately 180.  Fewer 
jurisdictions may reduce political fragmentation leading to land-use mismanagement.35  
A 1977 editorial in the Arizona Republic, strongly defending annexation in the 1950s and 
later, claimed that ". . . the entire Valley of the Sun would be a governmental shambles if 
annexation hadn't been carried out"36 (although it did not elaborate on the deleterious 
consequences). 
 From the perspective of some residents, annexation was desirable because of the 
municipal services it would bring, and some city officials cited extension of services as 
one of their motivations.  Other residents, however, had moved precisely to avoid living 
in a city and opposed annexation.  Some did not wish to pay city property taxes even 
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though services would improve.37  Property owners sometimes asked for assurance in 
advance that a property would be rezoned (e.g., from agricultural to commercial) if they 
agreed to annexation.38 
 Property owners are important actors in the urban growth machine coalitions 
studied by Harvey Molotch and others.39  Molotch also listed other local businessmen, 
including investors in locally oriented financial institutions, lawyers, syndicators, 
realtors, publishers or editors of metropolitan newspapers, and others whose futures 
depend on growth of the metropolis as a whole.  These include leaders of public or quasi-
public agencies such as universities and utilities.  Groups such as urban planners, 
neighborhood associations, cultural institutions, and organized labor also may participate 
in growth machine coalitions.  Molotch argued that any given locality is an aggregate of 
competing land-based interests and that a desire for growth motivated politically 
mobilized local elites toward consensus on growth-related issues.40   
Annexations were requested by some developers as part of their growth strategies.  
For example, Continental Homes asked the Phoenix City council to consider annexation 
of Pima Ranch, where it hoped to create a major residential development.  The Council 
scheduled a policy session in January 1980 to discuss the pros and cons of the case and 
the financial implications of annexing a larger area, including Pima Ranch, south of the 
city.  Avanti Mortgage Company of Phoenix, which wanted to develop a 33-acre 
industrial park, requested annexation of 620 acres in 1987 in order to receive Phoenix 
services.  However, other developers opposed annexation of undeveloped areas, 
preferring to develop under county jurisdiction and have residents request annexation 
later if they wished.  Pulte Homes, for example, opposed annexation by Queen Creek of a 
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project site in Pinal County in 1998 because the town would require lower-density zoning 
than the county.  If Pulte could get the land rezoned in the county before annexation, the 
more profitable higher-density zoning would persist even if the town later annexed the 
land.41 
Thus, while developers sought urban growth along with other members of growth 
machine coalitions, and extended the urban fringe through the developments they built, 
they did not always seek annexation.  Annexation was desirable to them only when they 
thought it would increase their economic returns from property development.  Those 
returns depended on local zoning practices, among other factors.  This highlights the 
importance of legislative and regulatory frameworks at the local as well as the state level 
in influencing where and when annexation occurred.  It also shows that some members of 
a growth machine coalition may seek economic but not political expansion of a 
municipality.  
Another member of growth machine coalitions is the metropolitan newspaper, "a 
business which has its interest anchored in the aggregate growth of the locality."42  
Eugene Pulliam, publisher of the Arizona Republic and Phoenix Gazette, promoted the 
booster point of view and editorialized in favor of annexation, while taking a 
conservative stand against communism, labor, and big government and opposing activist 
politics and the citizen initiative.  According to his grandson, Pulliam's concern that 
Phoenix would be strangled financially by satellite towns taking money and the property 
tax base outside the city led him to recommend an annexation program to Mayor Jack 
Williams after his election in 1956.43  
Pulliam's newspapers strongly supported charter government candidates, who 
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won on a reform platform in 1949 and dominated city politics until 1975.  "By the time of 
Gene Pulliam's death in 1975, it [the charter group] was accused of being an 
undemocratic small group of businessmen running the city for their own financial 
interests.  But in the early years it was the key to the growth of Phoenix, providing an 
efficient, growth-oriented city administration that could attract industry."44  Urban 
growth and aggressive annexation were central to the vision of charter government 
proponents, who sought a leading role for Phoenix in the Salt River Valley and in the 
Southwest.45 
 The Pulliam newspapers also supported major bond issues for parks, water, 
sewers, streets, libraries, and other city services, even when they required additional
taxes.  However, in 1973 they became powerful opponents of the proposed Papago 
Freeway that city leaders considered essential for further growth.  Pulliam was concerned 
about the freeway's social and environmental impacts.  He feared that the freeway would
divide the city and was concerned about its impact on the natural beauty of the area and 
the quality of life of Phoenix residents.  Allying with environmentalists and McGovern 
liberals, and breaking with other members of the growth machine coalition, such as th
Phoenix Real Estate Board and Chamber of Commerce, his newspapers prevailed in 
blocking the freeway in the 1973 election.  However, when the issue returned in 1975, the 
freeway was app
 
 
e 
roved despite the strident opposition of the newspapers, whose influence 
was wa
r 
ning.46   
Water also influenced annexation decisions.  Arizona's 1980 Ground Water 
Management Act required that new subdivisions in Active Management Areas, where 
groundwater was being depleted, have a 100-year water supply.  This created a reason fo
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developers to seek annexation of their properties by municipalities, since the properties
then would qualify as having an assured water supply.
 
 
 to 
ndwater, 
ells at a distance; they 
 
ay annexation to become effective without 
47  In the mid-1980s, water also
may have been a motivation for municipalities to annex.  Legislators in 1985 voiced 
concerns that cities were "battling for more land so they can qualify for more Central 
Arizona Project water."48  More recently in Peoria, however, availability of water has 
become a precondition for annexation rather than a motivation.  The city is not eager
annex areas that do not bring their own water supply with them, and it requires that 
development and annexation agreements for large developments include a water budget 
indicating anticipated demand and supply.  In some areas without sufficient grou
developers were required to pay for the drilling of new w
eventually would be used to pipe water into the area.49   
 In some U.S. cities, annexation was motivated by a desire to dilute the city's 
minority vote.50  In the Phoenix area, some annexations, especially in later decades, were 
of territory containing few people; they did not bring a large additional white population 
into the city.  Phoenix also had a smaller nonwhite population than many other annexing 
cities.51  However, the issue was raised in Phoenix in 1979, following several 
annexations that added thousands of voters.  Plaintiffs in a suit filed in October claimed 
that an annexation in May diluted the strength of minority voters.  The plaintiffs sought to 
halt the November 6 primary election on the grounds that the annexation and precinct 
changes had not been screened by U.S. Department of Justice as required by the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.  Screening determined whether racial and ethnic voting patterns 
reflected those of the rest of a city, so that minority voting rights were not weakened.  
The Justice Department allowed the M
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objectio
ies into 
ed 
 
 
 
 be 
not want to 
the city at the prices being offered and who feared municipal 
compet
n, although it reserved the right to object later.52 
Racial considerations may have worked against annexation of certain areas.  Amy 
Bridges argued that in the 1950s, annexation of poor African-American communit
Phoenix was delayed, whereas newer communities further out were annexed and 
provided with streets and utilities.  The black community in the southernmost part of 
Phoenix "was annexed just in time for the 1960 census."53  She did not explicitly argue 
that revenue concerns overcame the earlier reluctance to annex these areas, but as not
above, a larger population at census time meant greater revenues for a municipality. 
 More typically, however, municipal officials in Phoenix were important agents in
promoting annexation, often taking the leading role.  Their methods included using city
employees and later, paid circulators, to gather petition signatures.  They were able to
overcome early opposition from the Central Avenue Dairy, which did not want to
subject to the city's health standards and connect to a municipal sewer line, from 
industrialists such as Oscar Palmer, whose Palmer Manufacturing Corporation objected 
to Phoenix's building code, and from private water company owners who did 
be acquired by 
ition.54 
As noted above, opposition to annexation also came from some potential 
residents, who sought to avoid taxation for city services or to preserve a less urban 
lifestyle.  They were satisfied with services provided by the county and might oppose 
incorporation as well as annexation by an existing municipality.  Sunnyslope residents 
voted against incorporation four times in the 1940s and 1950s before being annexed in 
1959 by Phoenix, which was eager to prevent the formation of a satellite town.  In the 
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1980s and 1990s, annexation also was opposed by city council members who objected 
that annexations were expensive, delayed service provision for areas already in the city, 
and discouraged infill.55  Similar views were expressed in 2003 by city council candidate 
Tom Si
re 
ce to 
ronmental 
 pursuing annexation, and from some 
ccessful incorporations, as discussed below.57   
 
 VALLEY OF THE SUN 
mplot, who called for a moratorium on major annexations.   
Simplot was described, however, as "one of only a handful of voices, including 
Linda Nadolski in the mid-90s, who have called for curbs on large-scale growth while 
running for office in a city that annexes so aggressively."56  Pro-growth sentiments were 
dominant in Phoenix throughout the second half of the twentieth century.  Although the
was some popular opposition, the opponents were not as well organized as city policy 
makers, and Phoenix does not appear to have experienced the same level of resistan
annexation across a broad political spectrum that was found in other cities, such as 
Tucson and Albuquerque.  There, according to Michael Logan, ethnic and envi
considerations were important motivations along with individualistic and anti-
government attitudes of the type also seen in Phoenix.  Phoenix did face considerable 
opposition from other municipalities that also were
su
ANNEXATION IN THE
1950s: Tax Exemptions for Industrialists 
 Significant annexation in the Phoenix area dates from the late 1950s.  The 
municipal reforms of 1948-1950 established charter government, with a strong city 
manager and better municipal administration.  Potential Phoenix residents had more 
confidence that, if annexed, they would live in a well-managed city.  Previously, many 
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fringe area property owners who thought municipal government was inefficient and 
unprofessional had refused to sign annexation petitions.  Annexation initially proceeded 
slowly, due in part to lack of city staff and to legal and political challenges by annexa
opponents.  Major cities sought changes in state laws to make annexation easier, but 
legislation governing the annexation process actually became more restrictive in the mi
1950s.
tion 
d-
le, proved liberal enough to 
clear.  
 
xation 
rty owners 
proved 14 
 the city sales tax for business and industry and the annexations 
proceed
58  However, based on his study of Phoenix during 1944-1973, William Collins 
concluded that "in the end the annexation law, while not simp
allow the city to acquire nearly all the land that it sought."59 
 The role of revenue motivations in early annexation efforts is not entirely 
Phoenix City Manager Ray W. Wilson denied in 1951 that the need for more tax 
revenues was a reason for city expansion and thought that "annexed areas receive more in
services for several years than they contribute in taxes."60  The argument for anne
made by the Arizona Republic in 1957 was that "Phoenix is a metropolitan area.  
Industries in this area can choose between a handful of small, autonomous cities, with 
duplicating services and inefficient operation, or one large municipality of the type now 
enjoyed by Phoenix.  We'll choose the latter, and we think most people will agree."61  In 
1958, to ensure successful annexation, the city was willing to forego sales tax revenues, 
as well as to amend its building code and zoning ordinance and to assure prope
that property tax rates would remain stable.  Industrialists in southeastern and 
southwestern areas opposed annexation and argued that they needed tax exemptions to 
compete effectively while being inside the city.  On March 24, 1959, voters ap
exemptions to
ed.62 
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However, John Williams, the city's finance director, argued that increased 
property tax revenues from the highly valued industries would offset the lost sales
revenues.
 tax 
t 
n 
rn for the much larger benefits that 
e firms in the city."65 
urt 
ottsdale 
.  
that some residents on 
63  According to John Wenum, who studied annexation by Phoenix and 
neighboring municipalities, "despite their disavowal of tax-base expansion as a goal of 
annexation, nine [of forty-one public and private] respondents indicated that this migh
have been a consideration in the annexation of a large industrial tract in 1959."64  A
Arizona Republic editorial in 1975 stated that "the industries have paid far more in 
property taxes than they have saved through the sales tax 'concessions' . . . the voters 
approved the small price paid for annexation in retu
would stem from having thes
1960s: Contested Borders 
 By the end of the 1950s, cities were approaching each others' boundaries (see 
Figure 3) and considerable acrimony ensued.  The most heated conflict, which began in 
1956, was between Phoenix and Scottsdale.  The two cities ended up in protracted co
battles after attempting to annex the same land.66  The Arizona Republic reported in 
March 1963 that the "recurring annexation war between Phoenix and Scottsdale erupted 
anew yesterday" and noted a few days later that "in this vast space, two booming Valley 
cities are competing for the right to expand to make way for future growth."67  Sc
accused Phoenix of "trying to hem us in from the north."68  Scottsdale's original 
incorporation in 1951 was motivated by its fear of being swallowed up by Phoenix
Tempe and Glendale also reacted to Phoenix's expansion by attempting to annex, 
sometimes unsuccessfully.  Relations between Phoenix and Glendale were not as bitter as 
those among the other cities, for several reasons including the fact 
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Glendale's fringe actually preferred to be annexed into Phoenix.69 
 Some efforts were made to halt the border wars, although they did not always 
have lasting success.  Phoenix and Glendale created a "neutral area" in 1958 and later 
extended the arrangement to other areas.  Phoenix and Scottsdale agreed on "spheres o
annexation influence" in 1964.  In 1968, Chandler and Tempe passed a "gentlemen's 
agreement" setting out which areas could be annexed by each city in the future without 
prior approval of the other city and establishing an open area between them which was to 
be jointly planned.
f 
ndler in 
e 
 
ies; 
y 
rence, 
entlemen's agreements made in the 1980s but ignored by new city and town managers.74  
70   The agreement was reaffirmed in 1971 but violated by Cha
1974, setting off the annexations by Gilbert and other cities described below.71   
 Similar attempts were made in later years.  In 1978, Phoenix and Scottsdale 
agreed not to annex land across their respective sides of Scottsdale Road, and in 1985 th
two cities agreed upon the 56th Street alignment as a future boundary.  In order to gain 
Phoenix's assent to incorporation, Cave Creek agreed in 1986 not to extend its boundaries
south of the Carefree Highway.  But it later reneged on that agreement, claiming it was a 
"blackmail agreement."72  In 1987, Chandler entered an agreement with Gilbert to draw a 
boundary line dividing 16 square miles of unclaimed land between the two communit
the hope was that the agreement would prevent future "land grabs" and contribute to 
more systematic planning.73  As growth spread beyond Maricopa County to Pinal Count
(between Phoenix and Tucson), the municipalities of Casa Grande, Coolidge, Flo
Maricopa, and Eloy worked on official intergovernmental agreements to replace 
g
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1970s: Pre-emptive Strip Annexation 
 In their annexations, municipalities could not "jump over" land that had been 
annexed by another city, even if that land was simply a narrow strip of property int
to serve as a barrier to another municipality's expansion.  The area inside the stri
remained county land (referred to as a "county island") until the strip-annexing 
municipality chose to annex it.  A 1974 annexation by Chandler spurred Gilbert in 1975 
to create the largest county island to date with a strip varying in width up to 200 feet tha
enclosed a 51 square mile area (see Figure 4).
ended 
p 
t 
 to 
rt 
d planning considerations and citizens' desire that Gilbert keep its rural 
tmosp
 
sland, but ultimately it did.78  Maricopa County Manager Robert 
provements.  That's 
  why many of them wait until roads and other improvements are 
  completed before they consider annexation.79 
75  Gilbert was seeking to prevent similar 
action by Mesa or Chandler.  In 1978 Gilbert was a town of 4,100 that was anticipated
grow to 125,000.  Gilbert Mayor Dale Hallock explained that "by doing the stripping 
we've taken in everything that could ever be in Gilbert and now we are in a position to 
very slowly go ahead and develop it."76  In a 1976 interview, Town Manager Lynn Stua
also emphasize
a here.77 
 County islands created headaches for county officials in law enforcement, road 
maintenance, and construction, who claimed that municipalities only annexed parts that 
benefited them, leaving behind pockets that needed extensive road work or bridges.  In 
the Gilbert case, the county Board of Supervisors was reluctant to continue developing
highways inside the i
Mauney argued that 
  Cities and towns look at annexation as a business venture, and the  
  profit motive is always there.  They want the tax base, but they  
  don't want to have to put a lot of money into im
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 County islands continued to pose problems and the League of Arizona Cities and 
Towns pressed for legislation making it easier to eliminate them.  A bill (not introduced 
by the League) that was signed into law in 2003 allowed counties to initiate annexation of 
parcels of 10 acres or less, though the process would be halted if more than half of the 
property owners, or cities and towns, objected.80  Some municipalities decided to cut off 
emergency and fire protection services to residents of nearby county islands who were 
not paying taxes to the municipalities and had contracted instead for services with a more 
distant private supplier (Rural/Metro).  Not surprisingly, such decisions were 
controversial, as when Goodyear refused to respond to a near-drowning call just outside 
the city.  Ultimately services were resumed by Goodyear and Avondale, who planned to 
charge Rural/Metro a steep price for providing them.81  
 The 1975 Gilbert strip annexation was challenged in court.  The annexation law 
required consent of the owners of at least 51 percent of the assessed valuation of the area 
to be annexed.  The suit claimed that Gilbert annexed all of the property of those favoring 
annexation, but only part of the property of those opposing it.  The rest of their property 
was not included in the calculations to determine whether 51 percent was attained.  The 
Arizona Republic reported that "Lawyers for the town concede it used that method in its 
annexation, but say the action was legal."82  The annexation was upheld, but the case 
helped to generate changes in the legislation discussed below.  A ruling by the Arizona 
Court of Appeals in a later case noted that "Glick indicated that some cities were 
engaging in "strip" annexation, that is, were artificially extending their boundaries to 
include potentially high value taxable areas, or to defend against the encroachment of 
equally aggressive neighboring municipalities.'83 
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 One neighboring East Valley community—Mesa—was reported to have been 
relatively unconcerned by Gilbert's 1975 annexation.84  However, Mesa pursued its own 
aggressive annexation plans and municipalities to the west of Phoenix, including 
Tolleson, Avondale, Goodyear, and Peoria, all joined in border wars in 1976-77.  Like 
Buckeye in more recent years, the first three were tiny communities (populations under 
7,000 in 1970) that added vast amounts of land.  In June 1976, Phoenix strip annexed 
around an area of about 37 square miles "in response to the threat that Tolleson would 
annex an area that Phoenix officials feel is in the path of natural Phoenix expansion."85  It 
added another 5 square miles in July "so Avondale wouldn't annex the world," according 
to Councilman Ken O'Dell.86  In July 1977, Phoenix annexed a 25-foot-wide strip around 
a 14-square-mile area in Deer Valley.  An editorial in the Arizona Republic asserted that 
Phoenix was "again maintaining its right to grow" in the face of possible incorporation of 
a city of Deer Valley or possible strip annexation of the area by Peoria.87 
 Stealth was involved in some cases.  In May 1976, "Goodyear annexed a parcel of 
land a few hours ahead of its neighbor city [Avondale]," sparking a dispute.88  A few 
years later the Arizona Republic reported that "the southern boundary of Phoenix was 
locked into place permanently Thursday when the City Council called a special 
annexation meeting on short notice to head off a rumored intrusion by Chandler into the 
Ahwatukee area."89  Chandler had been scheduled to consider an annexation that 
Thursday night. 
1980s: Changes in Annexation Legislation 
 The 1980s brought two important changes in annexation legislation.  Strip 
annexation was outlawed in 1980.  "A city or town shall not annex territory if as a result 
 20
of such annexation unincorporated territory is completely surrounded by the annexing 
city or town."90  Territory annexed had to adjoin the annexing municipality for at least 
three hundred feet and had to be at least two hundred feet in width, exclusive of 
highways, and no more than twice as long as it was wide.91  In 1986, other changes made 
annexation more difficult.  A waiting period of thirty days before signatures could be 
collected on annexation petitions was imposed.  During that time a public hearing had to 
be held after notices had been published, posted, and mailed to relevant parties.  The 
petition had to be "signed by the owners of one-half or more in value of the real and 
personal property and more than one-half of the persons owning real and personal 
property that would be subject to taxation by the city or town in the event of 
annexation."92  Previously, annexations could be done with the signatures of a very few 
large property owners whose property was worth more than one-half of the assessed 
value in the area to be annexed.  In one extreme case in 1977, the 14-square-mile Deer 
Valley annexation, Phoenix annexed the entire area with the signature of a single 
property owner.93 
Some cities rushed to annex before the 1980 legislation took effect.  Scottsdale's 
City Council met at 7 a.m. on June 30, 1980 to approve an annexation by which a 10-
foot-wide strip enclosed 86 square miles, an area nearly equal to the city's size.  The 
action was challenged by several lawsuits alleging violations of the state's open meeting 
law.  In July, Chandler prepared plans to surround 36 square miles with a similar strip."94  
Despite the outlawing of strip annexation, annexation wars continued in the early 1980s.  
Conflicts among Phoenix, Scottsdale, Cave Creek, and Peoria were an important impetus 
for the 1986 legislation.95  As an initial step in 1985, a one-year moratorium on city 
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annexation involving state land was approved.  Legislators wanted a year to study 
possible legislative changes; they feared annexations of outlying areas would encourage 
leap-frog development, discourage in-fill, and drain a city's water resources.96  In 
addition to making the changes described above, the 1986 legislation allowed 
deannexation of territory to cure some of the problems created by past strip annexa
However, because the deannexation law only applied to a select group of Arizona cities 
and towns, it was declared unconstitutional in 1990 by the Arizona Suprem
tion.  
e Court.97 
 After the passage of the 1986 legislation, and in response to Phoenix City Council 
discussions on the merits of annexation, a multi-departmental task force produced an 
annexation policy study analyzing the issues.  City Council member Linda Nadolski had 
been vocal in opposing further annexation, which she argued had negative fiscal 
consequences for existing city neighborhoods.  Others had suggested that the city should 
promote growth within its existing boundaries and thought that annexation encouraged 
urban sprawl.  The annexation policy study reaffirmed the conclusion of the 1974 staff 
report that annexation had positive long-term benefits.  It did, however, recommend 
careful determination of which areas should be annexed and of the optimum timing for 
annexation.  Evaluation criteria were proposed to be used by staff in reviewing each 
proposed annexation area.  Phoenix planning officials remained committed to a policy of 
expansion, although the Planning Department did reject a few annexations that did not 
seem appropriate at the time they were proposed.  Both revenue and planning 
considerations remained important for city officials.98 
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1990s: West Valley Growth 
 Although the tightening of the legislation made it more difficult, annexation 
continued in the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1 and Figure 5).  Much of the annexation of 
the 1990s and after 2000 occurred in the West Valley, with Buckeye and Peoria 
registering especially large increases in land area.  For some time Peoria and Phoenix had 
been jockeying for position in the northwestern area near Lake Pleasant.  A compromise 
plan recommended by the State Land Commissioner in 1987 identified areas for future 
annexation by each city and left about 40 percent of the contested area outside both.  
Annexations within these areas proceeded in later years.99 
 Buckeye's expansion was especially dramatic.  It followed in the footsteps of 
Surprise, another small West Valley municipality that had annexed a large amount of 
territory in the 1980s to position itself for future development.  In 1999, Buckeye 
annexed the site that would become the Verrado development created by DMB 
Associates.  With an annual town budget of $2.6 million, Buckeye hoped to see Verrado 
bring annual property-tax revenue of $10 million.  An even larger annexation of 35,000 
acres in 2002 had been requested by the developers of Douglas Ranch, a master-planned 
community that eventually could include 83,000 homes over the next half-century.  John 
DiTullio, the developer's representative, and Buckeye's Mayor Dusty Hull argued that the 
annexation would bring control of water resources essential for the town's future growth.  
With Douglas Ranch added to other large-scale developments already approved by the 
Buckeye Town Council, over 240,000 new housing units were projected for a town 
whose population at the time was approximately 7,000.  As a result of its ambitious 
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annexations, Buckeye became second in area only to Phoenix among Valley 
municipalities.100 
 An overall shift in the focus of growth from the East Valley to the West Valley 
occurred in the 1990s and after, partly due to development of highways west of Phoenix 
and to availability of land.  In 1991, about 26 percent of Valley housing starts occurred in 
the west; by 1999 its share was 40 percent, more than the northeast or southeast.  
Population continued to soar in many East Valley municipalities as well, but the West 
Valley attained a new presence in the region.  Its municipalities competed hard for 
facilities.  Glendale was successful in two major cases.  It landed the new Coyotes 
hockey arena after negotiations for a Scottsdale site at Los Arcos failed, and it won out 
over Tempe and Mesa after a nearly two-year battle to attract the Cardinals football 
stadium, which opened in 2006.  Glendale offered an attractive site to be purchased by 
the Cardinals and the creation of a Community Facilities District, which would issue 
bonds for $48 million of on- and off-site improvements and retire the bonds through a 
combination of parking fees, surcharges, and sales taxes at the site.101 
 Glendale also reversed its annexation policy in 2005 as projected improvements 
in the Loop 303 freeway led city officials to anticipate increases in land values and 
development along the freeway route.  This area lay within the territory strip-annexed by 
Glendale in the 1970s.  The city had not been eager to annex the unincorporated territory 
and had considered annexations only if property owners approached the city and were 
east of 115th Avenue.  However, with the prospect of sales, construction, and property 
taxes from new properties included within the city, Glendale began actively courting 
property owners for annexations.102 
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2000-: State Trust Lands 
 Further opportunities for annexation are becoming more limited.  Much of the 
remaining undeveloped land around Phoenix is owned by the state or federal government 
or by Native American tribal communities.  State trust lands are available for annexation 
and pose some interesting issues.  At the time of Arizona's State Enabling Act in 1910, 
which allowed the Territory of Arizona to prepare for statehood, sections of each 
township were assigned to be held in trust for funding public schools.  This was a 
common practice but unlike many states, Arizona retained ownership of much of its trust 
land rather than selling it quickly.  The trust has a fiduciary responsibility to manage its 
assets in the interests of its beneficiaries and the Arizona Enabling Act and Arizona 
Constitution specify that the trust lands cannot be sold or leased except to the highest and 
best bidder at a public auction.  These requirements put constraints on what the Arizona 
State Land Department can do with the land and create difficulties for environmental 
groups and municipalities that want to see open space preserved rather than developed.  
At auctions during 2004, state trust lands sold at prices well above their appraised values, 
sometimes double or more the initial value.103  Appraisals subsequently were raised to 
higher levels, then were lowered as the housing market cooled after peaking in 2005. 
 Border wars can occur over state trust land as well as privately owned land, with 
more than one municipality hoping to annex the same piece of land.  The State Land 
Department declined to take sides in the dispute between Phoenix and Peoria over land 
near Lake Pleasant.  Instead, it required that the two cities work out their boundary 
dispute before the State Selection Board approved their annexation requests in December 
2002.  Phoenix had sought to annex west to 79th Avenue; Peoria had included the area 
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east to 67th Avenue in its General Plan and objected to Phoenix's annexation request.  The 
boundary ultimately ended up following the 75th Avenue alignment north of New River 
Road.104  
 A large area of state trust land to the south and east of Phoenix, in Pinal County, 
is available for annexation and is being viewed as an opportunity for more coordinated 
regional planning than previously typical in the Phoenix metropolitan area.  This area, 
known as Superstition Vistas, includes 275 square miles and ultimately may have a 
population of 900,000.  Similar hopes for regional cooperation have been voiced for the 
Williams Gateway area, located on a county island east of Mesa and the Phoenix-Mesa 
Gateway Airport, but within Mesa's municipal planning area.  The Arizona State Land 
Department owns land adjacent to a proposed mixed-use development there and hopes to 
increase the land's value by working with the developer (Scottsdale-based DMB) to plan 
and rezone a large area.  DMB petitioned the Mesa City Council in 2008 to annex its 5 
square miles and proposals to annex adjacent state trust lands are likely to follow.  Future 
disposition of state trust lands throughout Arizona may be affected by state trust land 
reform efforts, although attempts in 2006 and previous years to pass ballot initiatives and 
state legislation were unsuccessful.105 
 
POLICY ISSUES 
In addition to helping explain how Phoenix grew to its current size and urban 
form, the history of annexation raises some interesting policy issues.   Some are 
distributional issues captured by basic questions of political economy: who pays, who 
benefits, and who decides?  In Phoenix, city council members and others questioned the 
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policy of extensive growth and asked whether central city residents should bear costs of 
providing infrastructure to benefit newly annexed areas at the fringe.  They believed that 
annexation had negative fiscal consequences for existing city neighborhoods.  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess accurately the distributional consequences of 
annexation within municipalities and to determine the extent to which older 
neighborhoods subsidized newer ones.  Municipal budgets do not identify a distinct 
geographical location for all expenditures and revenues, and facilities or services may 
cover several neighborhoods. 
Beginning in the 1980s, development impact fees whose goal was "requiring 
growth to pay for itself" were adopted by Phoenix and other municipalities (and 
counties).  These are fees assessed on new developments to pay for the additional public 
facilities needed for them, such as water and wastewater treatment plants, parks, libraries, 
fire and police stations, roads, and others.  Although impact fees are an important source 
of funds, they remain only a partial solution to the problem of infrastructure finance in 
the Phoenix metropolitan area.  They do not cover the entire infrastructure costs of new 
development.  Due to the length of time it takes to do impact fee studies and get new fees 
approved, and to rising construction costs, they may yield insufficient funds for the costs 
they do cover.  They are complicated to assess and implement fairly, and do not fully 
solve the infrastructure finance "gap" problem faced by growing communities, since the 
fees are assessed on dwelling units and commercial space, but some public infrastructure 
needs to be built first.106   
Three additional policy issues can be raised.  First, did the bitter history of 
annexation wars make it more difficult for municipalities to cooperate on matters of 
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regional concern, such as transportation or environmental issues?  While some planners 
and others think it may have played a role, it was difficult to find examples of specific 
policy decisions that were blocked or made poorly that could be attributed to this cause.  
There may have been some examples in the area of transportation, such as streets from 
Phoenix that were not aligned to make it easy for Phoenix shoppers to get to Scottsdale, 
or delays in their construction.107  On the other hand, municipalities did succeed in 
coming to agreement on a major transit plan associated with a November 2004 
referendum to extend a half-cent sales tax due to expire after its initial 20 years.  Ongoing 
difficulties in reaching cooperation among municipalities may be due not primarily to 
historical memories of annexation wars, but to current situations that appear to 
participants to be zero-sum games. 
 A second policy issue emerges when annexation and the associated land-based 
growth path are no longer an option.  What happens when a city runs out of land?  What 
changes in policy become necessary when a city no longer can count on tax revenues 
from extensive growth?  One possibility is more intensive development.  The idea of 
promoting areas of intense development (urban villages) within a metropolitan area of 
low-density urban form arose in Phoenix in the 1970s.  Part of the motivation was a 
desire by city government to participate more actively in planning of locations for 
regional shopping malls, because they were important sources of sales tax revenues.108   
In 1979, the Phoenix City Council adopted an urban village model of growth.  It 
sought to create self-contained urban sub-areas (initially, nine villages) that would 
include housing, jobs, stores, and recreational and educational facilities and would be 
identifiable communities within the larger city.  However, the plan proved difficult to 
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implement and years later, many residents did not even know the name of their village.  
Studies of three of the villages showed that their travel patterns did not conform to the 
urban village concept.  Grady Gammage, Jr., a leading real estate attorney and keen 
observer of Phoenix growth patterns, has described the city's persistent ambivalence 
toward more dense development and tall buildings.  Ironically, some village planning 
committees became powerful opponents of developments that would increase building 
heights in their neighborhoods.109 
The need to consider intensive development became more urgent as some 
communities approached build-out.  Scottsdale found itself in that situation, partly due to 
its commitment in the 1990s to preservation of desert open space.  By 2003, Scottsdale 
had only about 4,000 acres of developable land left of its 117,000 acres and new-home 
prices were soaring.  The Morrison Institute for Public Policy issued a report arguing that  
Scottsdale needed to focus on intensive development and redevelopment and to become 
involved in three regional efforts: genome research, initiatives associated with Arizona 
State University, and a (related) push to top-tier science and technology status.  The city 
decided to put $130 million into redevelopment of the Los Arcos Mall into the ASU 
Scottsdale Center for New Technology and Innovation.  High-rise developments were 
accepted downtown as part of the more intensive strategy.  However, ambivalence about 
building heights continued and became a major issue in the 2008 City Council 
election.110 
 Chandler took a forward-looking approach.  Anticipating that vacant land wou
be nearly gone by 2010, it commissioned in 2003 an initial study of build-out, and in 
2004 a more extensive one.  One of the city's goals was to avoid serious strain on 
ld 
the 
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municipal budget as revenues from new home construction declined.  Retail and 
employment growth were expected to lag behind residential growth, but services still 
would need to be provided to residents.  The report's recommendations included att
to infill development and acceptance of higher densities and mixed use in selected 
locations.  Chandler also adopted a Mid-Rise Development Policy, with the proviso that 
"where proposed, mid-rise development should be consistent with the lower profil
ention 
e, less 
intensiv
le or 
 
lic 
mpensate property owners if land-use regulations reduced the 
e development pattern that characterizes Chandler today."111  
Tempe was landlocked early on (see Table 1).  It successfully redeveloped (or 
gentrified) its downtown during the 1980s.112  However, one tool that appears to have 
been important—the exercise of eminent domain—may be less available to Scottsda
other municipalities.  Eminent domain has never been popular in Arizona, a strong 
property-rights state.  Recent controversial cases inflamed opposition.  When Mesa tried 
to exercise eminent domain for redevelopment in the case of Bailey Brake Service, many
viewed the action as a taking for private developers rather than serving a genuine pub
purpose.  The courts ultimately blocked the action and the state legislature made the 
exercise of eminent domain more difficult by requiring a two-thirds Council vote and 
more public reviews and process.  Further revisions to the eminent domain law were 
passed in 2006 as part of Proposition 207, which also included sweeping provisions 
requiring government to co
value of their property.113 
 Phoenix probably will not face dilemmas associated with build-out for several 
decades, especially with its recent annexations in the north, but there has been concern 
about strengthening the city's downtown and about the impact of ongoing expansion at 
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the periphery upon the city's core.  Phoenix established a Downtown Development Office
in July 2004 and a major redevelopment plan including a downtown campus for Arizona 
State University, bioscience centers, light rail, and high-density housing, was adopted by 
the City Council in December.  At the same time, Phoenix appeared to be seeking to k
its options open for extensive growth.  When Cave Creek sought to annex 11 square
miles, pushing its western border to 24th Street, Phoenix objected to the State Land 
Department.  Cave Creek Mayor Victor Francia was reported to believe that Phoenix's 
action was a payback for Cave Creek's betrayal of its 1986 promise not to extend sout
Carefree Highway.  Whether or not that was the case, the annexation by Cave Creek 
would make it more difficult for Phoenix to annex Anthem and New River in the futur
It was unclear whether Phoenix eventually would seek to annex these areas as part of 
further northern expansion, although Rick Naimark, executive assistant to the Phoenix
city manager, denied that there were any plans to do so.  Cave Creek persisted and in 
2008 was pursuing an agreement with the Arizona State Land Department that would
entail annexation of 8.8 square miles, with much of the land rezoned for open space 
conservation, and more intense commercial develo
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State Land Department would receive revenue.114 
 Finally, even as the annexation wars wound down, competition for tax revenues 
remained intense.  When David Richert became Phoenix Planning Director in 1992, C
Manager Frank Fairbanks gave him a directive to stop the bleeding of sales tax at t
city's borders (i.e., the loss of revenues to neighboring municipalities).115  Within 
municipalities, the push for sales tax revenues may have led to inferior planning and 
zoning decisions.  Debra Stark, Peoria's Community Development Director in 2004, 
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described the possibility of properties being zoned for commercial use but then being 
unable to attract commercial development, sitting vacant, and eventually having to be 
down-zoned.116  Or, too many retail facilities may be built, they struggle to survive, and 
 be in 
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 Wal
e sales 
 
 
ly 1990s.  
cities end up with empty buildings if they fail. 
 In the Phoenix area as elsewhere, municipalities compete by offering tax 
incentives and other subsidies to developers to locate retail development, such as 
shopping centers or auto malls, within their boundaries.  It certainly would seem to
municipalities' interest, especially at a time of tight budgets, to avoid paying large 
subsidies for developments that would locate somewhere in the region in any case.117  
The dilemma, of course, is that they risk losing the development to another municipality
willing to pay, and many municipal officials feel that if the subsidies succeed, they are 
worth the price.  Citizens do not always agree; Scottsdale ultimately decided through a 
voter referendum not to provide a $36.7 million subsidy, approved by the City Counc
to -Mart to locate at the site of the former Los Arcos Mall in south Scottsdale.118 
 Joint revenue sharing agreements, in which municipalities agree to share th
tax revenues generated by a mall regardless of where it locates, can eliminate this 
dilemma.  Phoenix and Scottsdale tried unsuccessfully in the 1990s to create a joint 
revenue sharing agreement for development along North Scottsdale Road, which divides
the two cities and which at its intersection with the Loop 101 freeway is one of the last
remaining areas for development.  Part of the problem is that whichever municipality 
feels it is winning the competition has less incentive to make an agreement; over the 
years the balance shifted between Scottsdale and Phoenix.  Scottsdale snared Nordstrom 
for the Scottsdale Fashion Square Mall with a subsidy of $27.5 million in the ear
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But Phoenix later landed major commercial development along the west side of 
Scottsdale Road, including a $100 million luxury auto mall that opened in 200
popular new sh
2 and 
opping areas such as Desert Ridge Marketplace and Kierland 
 
ent was 
 host city was to receive the first $4 million in tax revenues and 75 percent 
thereaf
lls.  
 Surprise for Prasada, 
and $20
ion for 
 rather 
Commons.119 
 There have been two successful cases of revenue sharing agreements between 
Tempe and Chandler.  The first (1996) was for the Arizona Mills Mall, which ultimately
landed in Tempe.120  Guadalupe also was part of this arrangement.  The agreem
terminated in 2003 on the grounds that "there has been substantial commercial 
development within Chandler and the perpetual sharing agreement is no longer 
necessary."121  Tempe and Chandler also worked out an agreement in 1998 over a 
Chapman Chevrolet dealership that ended up in Chandler.  They agreed not to provide 
tax rebates; the
ter.122   
Much more typical, however, were large incentives, such as the $60 million 
offered by Gilbert and estimated $40 million by neighboring Chandler to lure auto ma
An agreement was announced in 2004 but it involved both malls being built without 
sharing revenue.123  Recent examples of incentives for mixed-use developments included 
nearly $100 million from Phoenix for CityNorth, $240 million from
 million from Mesa for the Waveyard water sports resort. 
Some Arizona legislators have not been pleased with municipal competit
tax revenues.  In 2005, they passed legislation to limit retail sales-tax incentive 
agreements.  Senate Bill 1274, sponsored by Senator Jay Tibshraeny and others, was 
intended to provide more transparency and accountability concerning agreements,
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than to stop them.  Municipalities were required to make findings, verified by an 
independent third party, that the incentive would raise more revenue than the amount o
the incentive (though a full fiscal impact analysis was not required), and that the retail 
business or a similar retail business would n
f 
ot locate in the municipality in the same time, 
place, o
etail 
an 
big 
operate
 of 
f that 
he Governor asked the 
legislat
r manner without the incentive.124  
Not all legislators felt this bill was sufficient.  They wanted to end "outlandish 
deals"; their goal was to "force the cities to stop giving public subsidies to big-box r
stores and auto malls."125  Senator Ken Cheuvront and others sponsored legislation 
imposing financial penalties.  Municipalities would lose state-shared tax revenues in 
amount equal to the incentive.  Senator Cheuvront (himself a small business owner) 
argued that legislation was needed because small business could not compete with "
boxes" that were given incentives.  He felt that market forces should be allowed to 
 and that business survival should not depend on government intervention.   
The legislation failed to pass in 2005 and 2006, but a similar bill (House Bill 
2515) was signed by Governor Janet Napolitano on July 2, 2007.  The penalties apply to 
cities and towns with exterior boundaries located entirely within the exterior boundary
a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) with a population of more than two million that 
provide tax incentives to retail businesses.  The Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale metropolitan 
area (Maricopa and Pinal Counties) is the only Arizona MSA with a population o
size.  An amendment to make the legislation apply statewide was defeated.  An 
unintended loophole exempted Peoria from the penalties, and t
ure to close the loophole at its earliest opportunity.126  
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Some municipalities opposed this legislation, as did the League of Arizona Ci
and Towns.  The main arguments were that it would limit municipal autonom
jeopardize Arizona's business-friendly reputation.  Their position was that decisions 
about incentives should be made at the local level.  Smaller, rapidly growing 
municipalities such as Avondale, Surprise, and Florence also argued that th
ties 
y and 
ey should be 
able to eate 
at 
 
g Pinal 
 
 in 2008 on a revenue-sharing 
pact for a 10.5 square mile parcel in Superstition Vistas, "to prevent municipal wars over 
landing major sales tax generators like auto malls."128   
 
 
use incentives in the same way that other municipalities had done earlier, to cr
a solid basis of retail sales-tax revenue by attracting retail establishments. 
In hopes of forestalling the 2005 legislation, the mayors of six municipalities 
(Avondale, Chandler, Peoria, Phoenix, Scottsdale, and Tempe) announced in January th
year that they were working together on agreements to stop sales-tax incentive wars.  
Chandler, Phoenix, and Tempe did ultimately agree to a truce creating a "no-incentive 
zone," but only in a small area along a portion of the cities' mutual borders.  In a 2007
study, the Morrison Institute called for a more far-reaching "sales tax treaty" amon
County and all of its cities and towns.  The treaty would include a moratorium on all 
incentives favoring one location in Pinal over another.  A portion of the sales-tax 
revenues received from car dealers, big box stores, and regional malls would be pooled
and divided using a formula based partly on population and partly on where the taxes 
were generated.127  As one positive example of action toward cooperative agreements, 
Mesa, Apache Junction, and Queen Creek were working
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CONCLUSION 
 The history of urban growth in the Phoenix metropolitan area has been one of 
expansion onto inexpensive land from which tax revenues could be reaped as new
were annexed into municipalities.  These fiscal considerations were an important 
motivation for annexation, particularly from the 1970s onward, although other factors 
such as a desire for planning control and sheer boosterism should not be overlooked.  The 
resulting border wars entailed court battles, pre-emptive land grabs, and mistrust betw
municipalities.  They ultimately helped to provoke state legislation in the 1980s that 
outlawed strip annexation and made annexation more difficult.  Annexation continued
however, both by municipalities such as Phoenix, which already had grown large 
continued to see physical expansion as crucial to ongoing prosperity, and by tiny
communities in the West Valley such as B
 areas 
een 
, 
but 
 
uckeye, which sought to replicate the 
 
istant 
on of the earlier history of border wars in 
Maricopa County. 
experience of Phoenix in earlier decades. 
 By the turn of the century, limits to annexation and to extensive growth were 
being approached by several communities, but competition for tax revenues continued 
unabated.  As some municipalities considered more intensive development strategies, 
inducements to developers to locate within their boundaries often were an important part 
of the package.  The distributional consequences of those inducements led to opposition 
both from citizen's groups and from state legislators concerned about the transfer of funds
from municipalities to private firms.  Where extensive growth continued, in more d
areas such as Pinal County, some municipalities hoped to craft intergovernmental 
agreements that might help to prevent repetiti
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FIGURE 1 
Growth of Phoenix, 1881-2005 
 
 
SOURCE: City of Phoenix, Phoenix Summary Budget 2005-06, Community Profile and 
Trends, p. 16, at http://phoenix.gov/BUDGET/bud05pro.pdf. 
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FIGURE 2 
Annexation by Maricopa County Cities and Towns, 1950-2000 
 
                             
 
 
 
  
                       
     1950                                                                                  2000 
 
SOURCE: Maps taken from “City Growth Time Line,” Maricopa County Planning and 
Development Department, Phoenix, Arizona. 
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FIGURE 3 
Annexation by Maricopa County Cities and Towns, 1950-1960 
 
    
 
             1950                                                                        1960 
 
SOURCE: Maps taken from “City Growth Time Line,” Maricopa County Planning and 
Development Department, Phoenix, Arizona. 
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FIGURE 4 
Strip Annexation by Gilbert, 1975 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Arizona Republic, January 19, 1975, B6.  Used with permission.  Permission does 
not imply endorsement.   
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FIGURE 5 
Annexation by Maricopa County Cities and Towns, 1980-2000 
 
 
 
1980                                                                             2000 
 
SOURCE: Maps taken from “City Growth Ti e Line,” Maricopa County Planning and m
Development Department, Phoenix, Arizona. 
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TABLE 1 
Land Area of Cities and Towns in Maricopa County, 1950-2005 
(Square Miles) 
 
        
Cities and Towns 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
   
Avondale 0.54 1.10 2.26 5.08 22.01 40.62 43.80
Buckeye 0.83 0.83 1.07 2.13 14.51 126.82 230.79
Carefree  8.80 8.81 8.81
Cave Creek  22.60 27.89 28.65
Chandler 0.68 2.89 4.11 23.63 47.84 52.94 63.49
El Mirage  0.22 2.13 7.60 9.92 9.92 9.88
Fountain Hills  16.67 18.23 18.26
Gila Bend  2.87 2.87 8.66 22.43 37.87
Gilbert 0.97 0.97 0.97 6.72 27.28 35.29 57.28
Glendale 1.27 3.66 15.23 39.45 50.30 54.34 57.01
Goodyear 0.31 0.45 1.02 5.91 113.85 115.37 118.42
Guadalupe  0.75 0.75 0.82 0.80
Litchfield Park  2.30 2.97 3.21
Mesa 5.82 13.77 19.70 65.38 113.20 124.38 131.07
Paradise Valley  13.40 13.60 15.23 15.40 15.39
Peoria  1.08 3.72 21.85 60.72 140.68 177.58
Phoenix 16.09 110.95 245.50 321.03 420.36 475.15 515.10
Queen Creek  10.14 22.22 26.08
Scottsdale  3.38 61.34 107.08 182.36 183.19 184.43
Surprise  1.06 1.47 60.30 67.70 76.35
Tempe 2.19 13.09 24.61 37.98 39.64 39.88 40.09
Tolleson 0.47 0.51 0.58 1.68 4.24 4.91 5.11
Wickenburg 1.02 1.33 3.43 6.10 10.93 11.39 14.80
Youngtown  0.96 1.00 1.25 1.30 1.51
   
 
 
SOURCE: Data provided by Maricopa County Planning and Development Department. 
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TABLE 2 
Sales Taxes as a Share of Revenue 
(Percent) 
 
  
Fiscal Year Phoenix All U.S. Municipalities 
 
 
Share of General Revenue From Own 
Sources 
 
1969-70 41.62 12.94 
1979-80 38.80 17.18 
1989-90 28.66 16.98 
1999-2000 34.44 NA 
2001-02 37.24 17.69 
  
 
 
Share of General Revenue 
 
1969-70 30.82 9.10 
1979-80 21.01 10.79 
1989-90 19.28 12.12 
1999-2000 22.96 NA 
2001-02 24.11 12.41 
  
 
 
 
NOTE: Sales taxes in this table include general and selective sales taxes that are part of 
general revenue from own sources.  General revenue from own sources (which also includes 
other taxes, current charges for commodities and services other than liquor store sales, and 
miscellaneous revenue) is one of two categories that make up general revenue; the other is 
intergovernmental revenue. 
 
SOURCES: U.S. Census Bureau, City Government Finances in 1969-70, Series GF 70-No. 4 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [henceforth, GPO], 1971), table 3, p. 7, 
table 5, p. 9; idem, City Government Finances in 1979-80, Series GF 80, No. 4 (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1981), table 3, p. 10, table 5, p. 13; idem, City Government Finances: 1989-90, 
Series GF/90-4 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), table 3, p. 4, table 5, p. 7; idem, Government 
Finances 1999-2000 (January 2003), table 4, p. 130, 
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/estimate/00allpub.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, City_Govt_Fin.zip, 
http://www2.census.gov/pub/outgoing/govs/special60 (for Phoenix in 2001-02); U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2002 Census of Governments, State and Local Government Finances, table 2, 
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/estimate/02slsstab2a.xls (for all U.S. municipalities in 2001-02). 
 
